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A few decades ago, highlighting the organisational specificity of universities was a common 
exercise. Most publications – from the Merton school of writings stressing the exceptional 
character of the academic profession to the decision-making analysis led by J. March and his 
colleagues (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972) that characterized universities as organized 
anarchies in which the garbage can model of decision making prevails – concluded that 
universities were not organisations “like others”. While these authors outlined the 
organisational particularities of universities, others also stressed their diversity due to the 
original models which influenced them (humboldtian, Napoleonic, Anglo-Saxon…) and their 
national implementation. Thus universities were not only specific organisations: they 
moreover followed national patterns. 
 
Since the 80s, two remarkable reverse trends developed that both contest the preceding 
assumptions. On the one hand, universities are expected to become like any other 
organisation. Their specificity is denied and managerial tools from the industrial sector (and 
in particular in firms) has been introduced in universities (Reed 2001 and 2003) which are 
supposed to become more entrepreneurial, more corporate, more accountable etc. Universities 
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have been made less “sacred” ; they are denied their exceptional character and asked to go 
through “economic rationalisation” and an “organisational shift”. On the other hand, this 
general trend should weaken the influence of the national models and therefore reduce the 
organizational variety among universities.  
 
But how far does this trend go and how successful is it? Could it mean that the resistance 
encountered by many of the managerial reforms and reported in almost every case study show 
that, even if less “special” than was thought some decades ago, universities nevertheless 
possess organisational characteristics that distinguish them from many other organisations? 
And if so, should we not better identify such characteristics? 
 
This contribution intends to discuss such issues by once again raising some old and forsaken 
questions: how much do universities differ from firms or from other public services? How 
“universal” are those characteristics? What impact do they have on university governance? 
How have they been affected by the recent reforms and transformations?  
 
To answer these questions, the paper will be structured into three parts. It will retrace the shift 
from specific university models to the more recent conception of universities as “ordinary 
organisations”. Then some specific organisational characteristics of universities will be 
identified. Finally the impact of the latter on university governance will be explored.  
 
1. The deconstruction of university as an organisational exception  
 
In this section, a first part will be dedicated to a rapid presentation of the models which have 
been developed before the eighties to describe and analyse universities and which in most 
cases underlined university specificities. The second part will focus on the reverse trend that 
began in the eighties and required higher education institutions to renounce their 
organisational exception, that is to become “organisations” like others. 
 
1.1. From models of university… 
 
The interest of organisation theorists for universities as a research issue can be traced back to 
the sixties in the US. Until then, the prevailing viewpoint of the academic world focused on 
 2 
its members rather than on its institutions and was dominated by the Mertonian approach. 
These organisation sociologists developed four different models mostly aiming at 
characterising decision-making processes, each model being supposed to better describe the 
very nature of universities than the previous ones. Some of these fundamental models led to 
the elaboration of a more general organisation theory.  
 
The first one is the collegial model. In its “original” version (Goodman 1962; Millett 1962), it 
relied on the assumption of the existence of an academic (scientific) community sharing the 
same norms and values and therefore able to come to consensual decision-making and to 
overcome individualistic and private antagonisms. B. R. Clark expanded this conception in his 
paper on ‘organizational saga’ (1971, 1972): in his view collegiality does not only refer to the 
academic professional norms and values, but more broadly to those shared by all the actors 
involved in the same institutional community – faculty members of course, but also 
administrators, students, trustees, etc. – and linked by the saga of its institution, its foundation 
and its history. It is easy to see how such an approach is narrowly correlated to the research 
field which developed in the 80s and focused on university ‘cultures’ (for instance Chaffee 
1984; Tierney 1988) further encouraging the idea that more than any other organisation, 
universities are characterized by the influence of specific values. 
 
This consensual values-based vision of universities was strongly contested by G. Baldridge 
(1971) who stressed the political nature of decision processes and concluded that neither 
academic nor institutional values were able to reduce the diverging interests at hand. For 
Baldridge, universities are filled with conflicts and power relationships that are to be taken 
into account in order to understand the negotiation and political exchanges that structure 
decision-making. When studying budget allocation in universities J. Pfeffer and G. Salancik 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1974; Salancik and Pfeffer 1974) adopted a similar perspective and 
further emphasized the role of power in such organisations. They concluded that the more a 
department was able to get support from the environment, the stronger it was in the 
negotiation of resources. Their study on universities became the starting points of the well 
known ‘resource dependence’ theory they subsequently developed (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978) in which they expanded their previous work on universities to other organisations. 
 
The third model which was explored relies on the path opened by sociologists such as R. 
Merton (1940), A. Gouldner (1935) or P. Selznick (1949), who discussed the Weberian theory 
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on bureaucratisation. Following a similar line of questioning, P. Blau (1973) deployed such an 
approach to universities. He showed that they are a decentralized type of bureaucracy, and 
more so for the organization of teaching than for research. This conception of higher 
education institutions as places where ‘bureaucratic’ features and rational logics are also to be 
found was then taken up by Mintzberg (1979), who defined universities as “professional 
bureaucracies”.  
 
The rational as well as the political nature of decision-making in universities was finally 
strongly contested by M. Cohen, J. March and J. Olsen (1972; see also Cohen and March 
1974) who described universities as “organized anarchies”, i.e. organisations characterized by 
multiple goals, unclear technology and fluid participation. They attached a specific model of 
decision-making to these organised anarchies: the garbage can model1. It refers to cases where 
decision-making results from the independent intersection of four ‘streams’: participants, 
problems, choice opportunities and solutions. Two main developments derived from this 
contribution. First the optimal rational model of decision-making as well as the procedural 
model defended by H. Simon (1955) (in which participants act according to their bounded 
rationality and cease looking for solutions once they meet one satisfying) were deeply 
destabilised. When the garbage can model prevails solutions are neither optimal nor satisfying 
because they often are disconnected from the problems to be solved, the linear process leading 
from problems to solutions becomes an exception (solutions may exist before problems); the 
hypothesis on the (absolute or bounded) rationality of agents is left aside and replaced by the 
attention potential of each participant. Second, possible expansion of this model to non 
academic situations has been discussed: see for instance Padgett (1980) for an extension to 
hierarchies and bureaucracy, Sproull et al. (1978) for an application on an educational 
department, or the well-known adjustment of this thesis to public policies led by J. Kingdon 
(1984).  
 
From the mid-1970s upwards, no new models emerged, as if higher education observers 
abandoned the idea of finding a new challenging model. Rather they combined the four 
existing approaches in three ways. First, some researchers empirically compared various 
universities and concluded that each of the four models could be met and that each university 
could be qualified by one of them. Some institutions were thus collegial, while others were 
                                                
1  For a discussion of this model see Musselin (1996, 1997) and Friedberg (1993). 
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rational, or political, or organised anarchies (see for instance Hardy et al. 1983 and Hardy 
1989 and 1992 on Canadian universities). Typologies could then be constructed, refined and 
become more complex (Hardy 1990: pages 38-39 in particular). Second, some authors looked 
at different decision-making processes within one single university and observed that they 
meet one or the other model according to the domain under study (funding, teaching, research, 
etc). These authors (for instance Davis and Morgan 1982; Taylor 1983; Ellström 1983; 
Birnbaum 1988) concluded that the specificity of universities was to shelter different models 
of decision-making. Third some dynamic hypothesis were proposed by authors like I. McNay 
(1995) or D. Braun and F.-X. Merrien (1999) who suggested that, collegiality and 
bureaucracy were two successive stages experienced by universities before they shifted more 
recently to the corporation and to the entrepreneurial models.  
 
This last perspective already announces the reversal which developed in the eighties. 
Beforehand, sociologists used universities as extreme case studies allowing the identification 
of organisational models that, in some cases, were further developed and adapted to other 
organisational situations. Recent decades are characterized by a denial of the specificity of the 
universities and by the importation of non academic models (corporation model, 
entrepreneurial model, managerial model, etc.) in universities.  
 
This transformation of the literature is linked to the evolution of the role of universities in our 
societies, but it is also a normative shift. Both orientation, pushing for the identification of 
university singularities or denying them, include some ideological and normative views from 
their authors. When describing universities as collegial entities, authors relied on their 
observations but at the same time were convinced that universities should be collegial. 
Notions like “organized anarchy”, “garbage can model” (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972) or 
“loosely coupled system” (Weick 1976), clearly – intentionally? – gave credence to the idea 
that such institutions are not ordinary ones and in a way intended to discourage the appointed 
presidents as well as public authorities to try to steer them. Reciprocally, the current credo 
about the necessity for universities to conform to models imposed on them is supported by 
rather objective factors (the transformation of higher education systems into mass education, 
the public finance crisis faced by developed countries…) but also includes more normative 
perspectives about the emergence of knowledge societies, the role of the university in such 
societies, the new public management rhetoric, etc. 
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1.2. …to universities as organisations 
 
In order to avoid the laborious2 description of the “new” models, I shall focus on the main 
mechanisms involved in the reforms aimed at transforming universities. In this perspective, N. 
Brunsson and K. Sahlin-Andersonn (2000) provides a useful analytical framework when they 
suggest considering these transformations as attempts at “constructing organisations”.  
 
For the two authors, this first implies the construction of identity and in particular the 
strengthening of autonomy: this has been one of the principal mottos of most higher education 
reforms, leading public authorities to delegate decisions they previously controlled and to 
incite universities to become less dependent on public funding. On the one hand, such an 
evolution goes along with the construction of boundaries: while faculty members traditionally 
feel much more committed to their discipline than to their university (Altbach 1996), various 
instruments worked at reinforcing the links between academics and their institution in the 
recent years. Among them, the development of internal labour markets (Musselin, 2005a) 
played a powerful role, but the introduction of accounting and management software tending 
to harmonize the individual practices also had an impact by “linking” university members by 
the same “tools” and by better defining who is inside and who is outside. On the other hand, 
such an evolution also encouraged “being special”: each university should now reveal its 
difference, look for differentiation, put forward its specificities and advantages in strategic 
plans emphasizing their singularities and their “distinctiveness” (Musselin 2004). 
 
For Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersonn “constructing organisations” also means building a 
hierarchy. This happened in universities through the emergence and implementation of more 
coherent institutional policies. Each institution being expected to develop a common project 
with shared priorities, it encourages more coordination as well as more control on individual 
behaviours in order to keep them coherent with the overall institutional project. This is 
achieved thanks to a strengthened executive leadership and a reduced influence of deliberative 
bodies (Kogan and Hanney 2000 for the United Kingdom, de Boer and Goedegebuure 2001, 
for the Netherlands). The role expectations towards academic leaders also changed. From 
primus inter pares intended to arbitrate between internal oppositions and to defend the 
                                                
2  Laborious because those models are not as strongly characterized as the four “university” models described 
above. The distinction between the corporate model, the managerial model, the entrepreneurial model, the 
learning organisation model, the service university model (and probably some others) deals much more with 
nuances than with identified and well established differences. 
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interests of their community, academic leaders are asked to become managers with new 
competences: academic recognition is supplanted by management skills.  
 
The construction of rationality (setting objectives, measuring results and allocating 
responsibility), the last process considered by Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersonn in constructing 
organisations, finally also occurred in universities. While their inability to set objectives was 
previously described as one of their main feature and specificity – M. Cohen, J. March and J. 
Olsen (1972) spoke of “problematic preferences” – they are now expected to select among 
their always more numerous (Gueissaz 1999) and incompatible goals and to define their 
specific profile. Differentiation is a rationale for this objective but it is also a way to motivate 
universities to conform with the schemes of action prevailing in other organisations and to 
define objectives, set the means necessary to reach them, act, and evaluate the outcomes. This 
thus tends to rationalise the production process within universities and to promote notions 
such as responsibility, relevance, accountability etc.  
 
Many features therefore document the existence of a trend transforming universities into 
organisations. Our argument is neither to contest this trend nor to criticise it but to observe 
that, surprisingly, this powerful evolution seems to have rather little impact on universities. 
As a matter of fact, many empirical studies analysing the concrete effects of these 
transformations come to question their “true” impact3 at the institutional level but even more 
at the individual level (see for instance, Bauer et al. 1999, Bleiklie et al. 2000, de Boer 2001 
and 2002, Henkel 2000, Kogan and Haney 2000, Mignot-Gérard and Musselin 1999, 2000 
and 2002, Reed and Deem, 2002).  
 
The high number of studies showing the limits of change processes is certainly not typical for 
universities. In all organisations, implementing change is challenging and encounters 
resistance. Universities do not escape this organisational trend. Nevertheless, it will be argued 
in the next section that some specific characteristics of universities further complicate the 
change processes pushed by the reforms and consequently affect the management (or 
governance) of such institutions. It is important to identify them, not to say that universities 
                                                
3  They also stress that the apparent convergence among the reforms launched, in fact results in national 
developments and implementations, often strengthening the individual characteristics of each national 
systems and increasing the organisational divergences between universities located in different countries 
while at the same time accentuating the differentiation within a single country (Kogan et al., Musselin 
2000). 
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are so specific that one should not even think of transforming them, but to better understand 
why the current reforms are facing problems and the kinds of difficulties they encounter.  
 
2. Organisational specificities of universities 
 
It will be argued that two characteristics (that can hardly be simultaneously observed in other 
industrial activities) are specific to universities. First, academic tasks are functionally loosely 
coupled. Second, teaching and research are unclear technologies.  
 
2.1.  Functional loose coupling characterises both teaching and research activities 
 
Functional loose coupling refers to the low level of cooperation and coordination required by 
teaching and research activities within higher education institutions (Weick 1976). In few 
other work places, if any, is it as frequent to ignore what colleagues seated next door are 
doing and observe so little influence of the activities of those colleagues on one’s own tasks. 
For instance, academics know very little about what is taught by their colleagues in the 
curricula in which they are involved: thus it has little influence in the preparation of their own 
teaching. Some disciplines are of course less affected than others by this. In a study recently 
led on French academics4 (Becquet and Musselin, 2004), we observed that physicists 
constitute small teaching groups (around five persons) among which one is responsible for the 
lecture courses, while others prepare the related discussion groups with the physicist giving 
the lecture. But they do not work with the other groups in charge of the other lecture courses. 
Furthermore, such an embryonic collaborative work is completely absent in some other 
disciplines under study, such as management or history. 
 
This distinction also works for research activities. Team work is rare and when it exists (as in 
experimental physics or biology for instance) it is limited to small groups within which 
cooperation is intensive. But between these groups cooperation remains vastly poor. More 
frequent and more developed cooperation generally occurs with groups/individuals in other 
universities, within national or international networks. 
 
                                                
4  It concerns four disciplines: physics, biology, management and history. 
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As shown by the recurrent complaints about the lack of multi-disciplinarity, interactions 
between entities belonging to different disciplines or located in different units (department, 
faculties…) are not “natural” and hardly binding. The interdisciplinary research entities which 
were recently created in French universities (often called Institut fédératif de recherche) 
perfectly illustrate the limits of such initiatives: their introduction (often associated with the 
dedication of one single building to house the different teams) hardly encourage more 
contacts and co-team work (Mignot-Gérard 2003). 
 
The very nature of teaching and research activities explains such observations: they can be 
developed in rather strong isolation and share characteristics with craft activities5 as defined 
by M. Granovetter and C. Tilly (1988). But it should not be forgotten that this specific 
character is also socially constructed, i.e. reinforced by academics themselves. They do all 
they can to keep cooperation and coordination among them to a minimum thanks to three 
main strategies. First, they coordinate only when it can not be avoided: for instance when 
courses have to be allocated, or when a collective activity report has to be written and 
submitted to some assessment procedures. But even such compelling devices may be diverted 
and managed in a way that limits collective work to a minimum (Henkel 2000). Analysing the 
teaching assessment led by the British Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), B. Cret (2003) 
observed that within the concerned academic departments, the preparation of the report to be 
sent to the QAA could be left to one single faculty member and that no common reflection or 
work was led. A second strategy to avoid cooperation consists in being reluctant to provide 
detailed information about the content of one’s activity. Thirdly, the best way to avoid others’ 
intrusion is to respect others’ autonomy (intimacy), i.e. not to look at or to discuss course 
content, not to interfere with research programmes, etc.  
 
Keeping cooperation among faculty members of the same university to a minimum is 
furthermore facilitated by the diversification of resources. The less faculty members are 
dependant on the resources provided by their institution, the less cooperative they can be and 
the less obliged they are to get involved in the internal “political” games for resources.  
 
                                                
5  “In craft industry (…), either one worker makes the whole object or supervisors coordinate the work of 
specialists who have complementary skills” (Granovetter and Tilly, 1988: 184). 
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2.2. Unclear technologies 
 
The second specific character of academic work relies in the fact that teaching and research 
are rather unclear technologies. This partly results from the capacity of academics to resist 
and argue against rationalisation attempts but is also linked to the intrinsic nature of such 
activities. Two dimensions participate to this unclear character. 
 
a) Teaching and research are complex processes which are difficult to grasp  
 
As for functional loose coupling, this characteristic is partly “constructed” and partly 
“intrinsic” to these activities. It is partly constructed because academics maintain opacity and 
because academic work has rarely been studied. It is only recently that teaching and learning 
in higher education institutions became a research theme. And there is probably a lot that 
could be done to better investigate what is involved in teaching. The reluctance of academics 
to open their lectures to researchers, the belief in teaching as a “private” autonomous activity, 
the quasi sacred character that was often attributed to such activities, prevented them from 
pedagogical and didactical research for a long time and still can discredit the relevance of 
studies that would look at such activities as sociologists considered workers on the shop-floor 
 
Research activities have been less protected from investigation than teaching. The 
anthropology of science (Latour and Woolgar 1979, Latour 1987) and the “strong 
programme” (Bloor 1976) in particular paved the way to more concrete approaches of 
research activity and made scientists less “sacred”. Nevertheless, even if they deconstructed 
the heroic figure of the scientist, the latter remains the principal actor, the network-builder 
(Callon 1989) and these approaches still contribute to pointing at the irreducible specific 
character of science (while denying it at the same time). They also do not completely open the 
“black box” and research is still an obscure process, even when wonderful descriptions have 
been written (cf. Knorr-Cetina 1996 for instance). Furthermore, such approaches only focus 
on one aspect of academic activities (research), ignoring the others and to do not explain how 
faculty members arbitrate among them. 
 
If we definitively lack studies on teaching and research, these activities also bear intrinsic 
characteristics that make them difficult to grasp.  
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First, research and teaching are simply difficult to describe. Sociologists can certainly 
improve their methodological tools to better succeed in describing them but a large part of 
such activities can not be “studied” such as other tasks.  
 
Second, because they are not described, they can hardly be prescribed. Up to now, 
competencies in such activities are mostly acquired through doing by one’s self, observing 
others, submitting results to senior colleagues, having them discuss in seminar, etc. It still 
remains informal, person-based, unstructured. Books entitled “how to prepare a thesis” 
provide fine tricks but they can not explain how to write a thesis in the way technical notices 
tell us how to use a mobile phone. Again this specificity should not be overestimated: some 
aspects or some advice can indeed be “taught” and formalised about writing papers, preparing 
a lecture, behaving with students etc. Therefore training young academics for their future 
activities, personal development courses, support to teachers confronted with difficult class 
situations, etc. should be expanded. Nevertheless, many aspects escape prescription and set 
limits to in-depth rationalisation processes.  
 
Third, because teaching and research are difficult to describe and difficult to prescribe, they 
are also difficult to reproduce. One can relate how Cricks and Watson (Watson, 1998) 
discovered the double helix structure of the ADN and thus how they win a Nobel prize but it 
is impossible to reproduce the same process for another scientific enigma and to prescribe 
how to become a Nobel prize winner. The same is true for teaching.  
 
Therefore, even if we have to recognize that there long has been an overestimation of the 
mysterious individual part of talent and “personal touch” in teaching and research, it would be 
misleading to completely deny that the production technology involved in teaching and 
research has nothing specific. The inaccuracy of those two extreme positions has clearly been 
stressed by the development of on-line curricula. On the one hand they proved that some 
teaching can partly be rationalised, formalised, reproduced and be supported by technologies. 
But on the other hand they often reveal the limits of such processes: in most cases, these 
technologies can not work without an impressive personal work from tutors and the 
maintenance of presential teaching (Miladi 2005a and 2005b).  
 
b)  Ambiguous causal relationships between tasks and results 
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The second dimension justifying the consideration of teaching and research as unclear 
technologies is linked to the ambiguous link between the way they are led and what they 
“produce”. What is the influence of what is taught and how it is taught, on the students? How 
does it affect the acquired competencies? What is the efficiency of a teaching situation 
compared with another? According to the signalling theory (Spence 1974) or the human 
capital theory for instance (Becker 1962), the reward gained by attending an elite university 
(for the first) or by studying one more year (for the second) is not linked to the content of 
what has been taught but to the fact of having been selected by the elite university (and the 
positive signal this represents) or of being able to attend one more year. There is for instance 
no evidence that French students attending the highly selective business schools are better 
trained that the university students attending the management programmes: but the former get 
higher salaries and better job positions and this can be explained either by the fact that they 
passed a selective process or by the teaching they received. We miss the correct instruments 
to measure which explanation is relevant and therefore often rely on highly speculative 
interpretations.  
 
The causal link between the way research is led and its results is all the more complex as there 
is no fixed definition of what constitutes “good” research. For some, it means relevant to 
society while for others it first has to conform with academic norms, and still for others to 
respect both aims. But there is also no agreement on the way research should be led to reach 
one objective or another. 
 
In many ways, research and teaching thus possess certain characteristics that are not shared by 
other work activities. This specificity should not be overestimated (as it often was the case in 
the past) and the recent trends in rationalising, measuring, assessing academic activities 
showed that they indeed can partially be affected by these processes. Nevertheless they also 
strongly resist such changes and this is due to their special features. The last part of the paper 
will be dedicated to the implications this has on university governance and change. 
 
3. Implications for change within universities 
 
This specificity of academic work has a direct impact on university governance, and as a 
consequence, on change processes. It affects the efficiency of the tools that may be used to 
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transform universities as well as the exercise of leadership in higher education institutions. On 
the first aspect it weakens the possibility to use formal structures as a levier to reinforce 
coordination and cooperation. On the second it modifies the exercise of leadership and the 
management of change within universities. 
 
3.1. The limits of formal structures and rules in universities  
 
Many of the reforms introduced in universities in order to transform them into organisations 
led to the introduction of more rules, more procedures, new structures, new management 
techniques (including management software, reporting methods etc.).  
 
In organisation theory, from the Taylorist “scientific organisation of work”, to structural 
contingencies or to the recent “rediscovery” of institution, among many others6, such 
instruments are often presented as powerful means to improve organisations. Even if very 
different in many respects, these perspectives all consider, to a different degree7, that formal 
rules and structures design, foster and organise coordination and cooperation. The hierarchical 
structure and the borders of productive units specify who is in charge of what and how 
interdependent tasks are to be managed. Formal procedures moreover describe part of the 
productive process: which tasks come first, which follow and how, etc. 
 
But in universities, formal structures and procedures, even if numerous, rarely favour 
cooperation and coordination. They hardly define what to do and how to do it because of the 
specific characteristics of teaching and research described above. Formal rules and structures 
may impose constraints, increase the bureaucratic burden, slow down the production process, 
etc. but they have little effect on content and even less on cooperation. To put it crudely: 
being part of the same unit, being managed by the same rules and having the same status does 
not increase the level of cooperation among the members of the unit. As a result, changing the 
formal structures most of the time has no effect. One of the French universities S. Mignot-
                                                
6  Perspectives as historical neo-institutionalism and economic neo-institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996) in 
a way  “rediscover” the importance of (formal) structures on human behaviours. 
7  The degree to which formal rules and structures succeed in limiting the actors autonomy may of course be 
discussed. For instance, in the research tradition in which I was trained (Crozier 1964; Crozier and Friedberg 
1977; Friedberg 1993), the capacity of rules and structures in strongly determining behaviours is put into 
question. It much more focuses on the way actors play with formal structures and rules and looks at how the 
latter in some cases act as constrains, while in other situations they became resources for the same actors. 
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Gérard and I studied (Mignot-Gérard and Musselin, 1999) provides a good example. Up to 
1992, it was composed of 17 faculties. The president decided to merge many of them and they 
were reduced to only 5. But six years later, the new faculties were still empty shells ignored 
and by-passed by the departments which were still operating as before.  
 
In universities, formal rules and structures weakly support hierarchical power. Being 
appointed (or elected) as an academic leader does not allow for much influence on work 
orientation. Even in American universities, in which the department chairs and the deans are 
more powerful than in most European universities (they negotiate different teaching loads, 
decide on differentiated salary increases, etc.), they are not directly involved in the daily 
allocation of work or in defining the precise content of tasks. Academics remain autonomous 
in shaping their own activity and the way they prefer to develop them8.  
 
The role of formal structures and rules in universities is therefore limited by the nature of 
academic activities and the unclear technology incorporated in them. They nevertheless are 
numerous and one can wonder why, if they are not efficient? Neo-institutionalism provides us 
with some clues in explaining this phenomena. According to J. Meyer and B. Rowan (1977), 
formal structures and rules can not increase cooperation and coordination (even on the 
contrary9) but are a way for organisations to appear as rational, to conform with the 
institutional environment and to gain legitimacy. This helps understanding why universities 
are organised in colleges or faculties, and then in departments. Once a organisation presents 
this kind of characteristics, it is identified as a higher education institution. Still following this 
research perspective, this convergence may be explained by the fact that leading higher 
education institutions are organised that way and regarded as models to imitate (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). But this also helps understanding why more and more formal structures 
and rules are introduced within universities: it is a way to comply with the environment 
pressures for being more organisations alike.  
 
                                                
8  In their paper on biologists and how they conceive and manage their relationships to industry, J. Owen-
Smith and W. Powell (2002) for instance always present the positioning adopted by each of the faculty 
members they describe as a product of their personal preferences. There is no reference to their institutional 
situation, or to negotiations with their department or university.  
9  A further interesting point for our discussion in Meyer and Rowan’s paper is that they argue that conforming 
with environmental myths in fact increases loose coupling within organisations. In this paper I argue that 
loose coupling reciprocally weakens the capacity of formal rules and structures to promote cooperation and 
coordination. We could then conclude that this increases their role as myths which further increases loose 
coupling, installing thus a kind of vicious circle. 
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But such an explanation does not highlight why strong resistance and severe conflicts arise 
when one attempts to change the structures. If formal structures and rules only existed to 
conform with institutional environments, it should be easy to merge the department of 
philosophy with the department of linguistics (Bleiklie et al. 2000: 197-205). Why do 
academics fight with eagerness against the transformation of formal structures while they 
always state that their department does not matter much? Because rules and structures 
nevertheless count! Not in fostering and prescribing cooperation but in defining territories and 
borders and in protecting insiders. In universities, instead of coordinating, rules and structure 
first have a defensive role and create protected territories (Musselin 1990). Attempts to 
suppress, to merge, to redesign such structures reveal this potential strength. Rules and 
structures build frontiers that few, if any, feel they may transgress. They do not favour 
cooperation but allow for defensive solidarity.  
 
This defensive capacity provided by rules and structures in universities further explains the 
limited effects of the newly introduced formal devices on the institutional and on the 
individual levels: while trying to increase cooperation and coordination, they generally 
exacerbate the defensive potential of the already existing rules and structures. They strengthen 
the previous solidarities and generally fail to create new ones. 
 
3.2. The delicate management of change within universities 
 
The issue raised in the preceding section is a significant example of the governance problem 
faced by leaders in universities. Most of the management tools and devices they are today 
expected to introduce have been deployed for organisations where functional coupling 
prevails and where technologies are clearer. This is not the case in universities. The two 
intrinsic characteristics of such activities first preclude the efficiency of top-down, 
hierarchical leadership. Second they complicate the diffusion of change and innovation: as 
stressed by K. Weick (1982), loose coupling allows for important transformation to happen in 
one part of the system without disturbing the other parts, but at the same time it impedes the 
diffusion of change from one part to another.  
 
What is then left to leadership in such organisations? A lot, providing that leaders accept to 
act in ways that would look unusual in other organisations. Relying on some of the 
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conclusions of S. Mignot-Gérard in her thesis on French universities, three strategies seem 
rather efficient to manage change for a presidential team.  
 
a) Have a project and stick to it 
 
What I call “project” here is not the “rationally elaborated plan consistent with well defined 
goals” denounced by J. March (1974) but refers to setting a direction, focusing on some 
orientations, providing a certain vision10 and giving an idea of the missions the university 
should focus on. The project itself may be centred on a specific domain or on a rather 
concrete application but it is always presented within a broader rhetoric arguing that such an 
evolution is inevitable, that everything pushes in this direction, that it is a priority for the 
future, etc.  
 
S. Mignot-Gérard furthermore observed that academic leaders who manage change not only 
have a project aimed in a clear direction but also keep it wide enough to preserve a sense of 
community. They avoid excluding and sanctioning but try to bring together and find ways to 
convince those who are opposed.  
 
Such projects then work like narratives that academic leaders repeat each time an opportunity 
is given to them. Repetition of the same visions, the same arguments, the same interpretations 
play a fundamental role. Keeping to them finally produces long term effects and may provide 
a collective framework enhancing cooperation more efficiently than formal structures..  
 
b) Facilitate and incite and then reframe, rather than impose 
 
In universities giving orders and imposing decisions happen to be more unproductive than 
anywhere else. First because the weakness of the hierarchical lines (due to loose coupling) 
alters the diffusion of directives. Second because the efficiency of universities relies on the 
capacity for innovation at the bottom level. And third because it generates resistance from the 
“defensive territories”.  
 
                                                
10  It is therefore closer to the conception of leadership put forward by I. Bleiklie (2004) when he applies P. 
Selznick’s (1958) conclusions to universities. 
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Therefore the management of change not so much relies on decisions from the top than on the 
selective promotion of actions coming from the base. It requires a lot of attention to 
initiatives, demands and projects expressed at the bottom level, incentives for those initiatives 
to develop, a capacity to negotiate and reword or reframe the demands in a way compatible 
with the global project of the university.  
 
c) Prefer formal to academic criteria  
 
An important issue for leaders is to succeed in having influence on the protective territories 
defined by the formal structures and rules without provoking defensive solidarities. 
Introducing criteria as disconnected as possible from academic norms and automatic, often 
appears to be a way to avoid resistance and epistemic argumentation. It is for instance easier 
to find an agreement on the fact that classes with less than six students should not be 
continued than on assessing that this or that curricula is not acceptable.  
 
Academic leaders may have an important role in developing such criteria and in diffusing 
them. It can be a way for them to implement their global project and to implement it into more 
concrete actions and decisions. 
 
As shown through these few examples, the exercise of leadership in universities requires 
adapting to the specificities of academic work and finding adequate instruments and style 
rather than “simply” transferring managerial tools. In other ways transforming universities 





Our main question at the beginning of this paper was: Are universities specific organisations? 
My answer is “Yes”. I argued that it is linked to the characteristics of teaching and research 
activities but also that this explains the limited effects of the recent reforms aimed at 
constructing universities into organisations by imposing non academic models on them.  
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Such a conclusion is not intended to disqualify the introduction of managerial tools and 
practices within universities. It simply stresses that the specificity of universities should not 
be ignored and that change should build on their specificities. Rather than being considered as 
obstacles for change and rather than fighting against them, they should be used as strengths 
and as resources.  
 
At a less pragmatic level this lessens the potential influence of the global model of organising 
that developed within the last decades. It is most of the time absorbed by the national 
characteristics of each university system: the twenty years of converging national reforms 
experienced by the European higher education systems sometimes produced radical changes 
but they were never paradigmatic (Hall 1993): they led to evolutions rather than to 
“revolution”, so that the new solutions and tools were aggregated to those existed and did not 
replace them (Musselin 2005b and 2005c). As a result, despite convergences in the objectives 
and rationales of the reforms, they often increased the scope of divergences among those 
countries11. The organizational characteristics of universities furthermore create an obstacle to 
the transformation of the institutional environments into concrete practices. Increasing loose 
coupling between the overarching global model for higher education and the universities 
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